Cdc laboratories Bolster Nations Testing Capacity While initial efforts were underway to develop a safe and effective vaccine to protect people against 2009 H1N1, work also was being done at cdc to help laboratories supporting health care professionals to more quickly identify the 2009 H1N1. The real-time pcr test developed by cdc was cleared for use by diagnostic laboratories by fda under an Emergency Use authorization (EUA) on April 28, 2009, less than two weeks after identification of the new pandemic virus. Prior to the availability of this eua, public health laboratories had been able to identify whether influenza a viruses were seasonal influenza viruses or were a novel strain, but the new diagnostic kits allowed labs to confirm a virus as 2009 H1N1. On may 1, 2009, cdc test kits began shipping to domestic and international public health laboratories. (Each test kit contained reagents to test 1,000 clinical specimens). From may 1 through September 1, 2009, more than 1,000 kits were shipped to 120 domestic and 250 international laboratories in 140 countries. Once labs had the test kits and verified that their testing was running properly, they were able to identify new cases more quickly than before and no longer needed to send samples to cdc for lab confirmation.
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Cdc also issued. Mmwr dispatch on the outbreak of 2009 H1N1 influenza infection in a high school in New York city, that was, at the time, the largest reported cluster of 2009 H1N1 cases in the United States. The dispatch suggested that the high school age students had respiratory and fever symptoms similar to those caused by a seasonal flu, but in addition, about half had diarrhea, which is more than expected with seasonal flu. As the details of the outbreak unfolded, the federal response continued in high gear. Also on April 30, 2009, hhs announced that the federal government would purchase an witness additional 13 million treatment courses of antiviral drugs to help fight influenza. The additional treatment courses would be added to the sns. As the outbreak spread, cdc began receiving reports of school closures and implementation of community-level social distancing measures meant to slow the spread bibliography of disease. School administrators and public health officials were following their pandemic plans and doing everything they could to slow the spread of illness. (Social distancing measures are meant to increase distance between people. Measures include staying home when ill unless to seek medical care, avoiding large gatherings, telecommuting, and implementing school closures).
On April 27, the who director-General raised the level of influenza pandemic write alert from phase 3 to phase 4, based primarily on epidemiological data demonstrating human-to-human transmission and the ability of the virus to cause community-level outbreaks. Based on reports of widespread influenza-like-illness and many severe illnesses and deaths in Mexico, cdc issued a travel health warning recommending that United States travelers postpone all non-essential travel to mexico. As in past influenza seasons, cdc urged the public and especially those people at highest risk of influenza-related complications, to protect themselves by taking antiviral drugs early in their illness when recommended by their doctor; cdc also advised that everyone take every day preventive actions. On April 29, 2009 who raised the influenza pandemic alert from phase 4 to phase 5, signaling that a pandemic was imminent, and requested that all countries immediately activate their pandemic preparedness plans and be on high alert for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like illness and. Government was already implementing its pandemic response plan. Cdc continued to post and update guidance for states, clinicians, laboratories, schools, partners and the public on topics ranging from the non-pharmaceutical measures communities could take to limit spread of disease, to how to evaluate a patient for possible infection with 2009 H1N1 influenza,. On April 30, 2009, cdc issued. Mmwr dispatch describing the initial outbreak of 2009 H1N1 influenza in Mexico. Findings in Mexico indicated that transmission in Mexico involved person-to-person spread with multiple generations of transmission.
World Braces for Possible pandemic, shredder on Saturday, april 25, 2009, under the rules of the International health Regulations, the director-General of who declared the 2009 H1N1 outbreak a public health Emergency of International Concern and recommended that countries intensify surveillance for unusual outbreaks of influenza-like. Also on April 25, 2009, new York city officials reported an investigation into a cluster of influenza-like illness in a high yardage school, and cdc testing confirmed two cases of 2009 H1N1 influenza infection in Kansas, and another case in Ohio shortly after. On April 26, 2009, the United States government determined that a public health emergency existed nationwide; cdcs Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) began releasing 25 of the supplies in the stockpile that could be used to protect and treat influenza. This included 11 million regimens of antiviral drugs, and personal protective equipment including over 39 million respiratory protection devices (masks and respirators gowns, gloves and face shields, to states (allocations were based on each states population). As part of the nations pre-pandemic planning efforts, by April 2009 the federal government had purchased 50 million treatment courses of antiviral drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir for the sns, and states had purchased 23 million antiviral regimens. After the determination of the public health emergency, fda also took action to expand possible usage of antiviral drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir by issuing. Emergency Use authorizations (EUAs). The euas allowed for use of the products in a manner different from what they were fda-approved for. This included allowing for off-label use of: oseltamivir to treat children younger than 1 year of age and to help prevent influenza in children 3 months to 1 year of age, and; oseltamivir and zanamivir to treat patients who are symptomatic for more than two.
On April 23, 2009, samples submitted by texas revealed two additional cases of human infections with 2009 H1N1, transforming the investigation into a multistate outbreak and response. At the same time, cdc was testing 14 samples from Mexico, some of which had been collected from patients who were ill before the first. Results from seven of the samples were positive for 2009 H1N1 and similar findings were reported for specimens submitted by mexico to canada. It had now become clear that cases were occurring in multiple countries and human to human spread of the virus appeared to be ongoing. That same day cdc held the first formal full press briefing to inform the media and guide the public and health care response to the rapidly evolving situation. Cdc held nearly 60 press briefings during the 2009 H1N1 response. On April 24, 2009, cdc uploaded complete gene sequences of the 2009 H1N1 virus to a publicly-accessible international influenza database, which enabled scientists around the world to use the sequences for public health research and for comparison against influenza viruses collected elsewhere, and an updated.
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Within a day, three additional samples of this new virus were identified in San diego county and Imperial county california hospitals and sent to cdc for further testing. Cdc laboratory testing confirmed that these samples also were positive for the virus that would come to be called 2009 H1N1. By april 21, 2009, cdc had begun working to develop a virus that could be used to make vaccine to protect against this new virus (called a candidate vaccine virus). There are many steps involved with producing a vaccine the first step is getting a good high yield vaccine virus. A high-yield vaccine virus is a sample of the virus that is used to grow the virus in mass quantities in chicken eggs. Once the virus is grown in mass quantities, the virus particles are then purified to make vaccine. Recognizing that 2009 H1N1 was a new flu and virus and, like all flu viruses, unpredictable - cdc simultaneously pursued multiple scientific methods to create a high-yield virus.
A virus isolated at cdc, (called A/California/07/2009) was eventually chosen to be the vaccine virus used to make vaccine. Cdc sent the vaccine virus to vaccine manufacturing companies so that they could begin vaccine production, in the event that the. Government should decide a vaccine was necessary. Cdc activated its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on April 22, 2009, to coordinate the response to this emerging public health threat. Response activities were organized into a team structure according to the. National Incident Management System (nims these teams had different areas of focus including but not limited to: surveillance, laboratory issues, communications, at-risk populations, antiviral medications, vaccine, and travelers health issues. As the outbreak unfolded, team structures and staffing were periodically assessed for functionality and utility.
Cdc began an immediate investigation into the situation in coordination with state and local animal and human health officials in California. The cases of 2009 H1N1 flu in California occurred in the context of sporadic reports of human infection with North American-lineage swine influenza viruses in the United States, most often associated with close contact with infected pigs. (During December 20, 12 cases of human infection with swine influenza were reported; five of these 12 cases occurred in patients who had direct exposure to pigs, six patients reported being near pigs, and the source of infection in one case was unknown). Human-to-human spread swine influenza viruses had been rarely documented and had not been known to result in widespread community outbreaks among people. In mid-April of 2009, however, the detection of two patients infected with swine origin flu viruses 130 miles apart, raised concern that a novel swine-origin influenza virus had made its way into the human population and was spreading among people.
Cdc remained in close contact with the international health community as the outbreak unfolded and on April 18, 2009, under the International health Regulations (IHR) the United States International health Regulations Program reported the 2009 H1N1 influenza cases to the world health Organization (WHO). The cases also were reported to the pan American health Organization (paho canada and Mexico, as part of the security and Prosperity partnership of North America. Cdc worked closely with state and local animal and human health officials on epidemiological investigations by tracing contacts of both patients to try to determine the source of their infection and by examining whether there was any link between the patients and pigs. Surveillance also was enhanced to try to detect additional cases of human illness with this virus. Based on the geographic location of the first cases, lack of contact between these cases and swine, and data collected through contact tracing and laboratory testing, cdc epidemiologists suspected that human-to-human transmission of this virus had taken place. In an article entitled. Swine Influenza a (H1N1) Infection in Two Children - southern California, march-April 2009 published on April 21, 2009 in the. Morbidity and Mortality weekly report (mmwr), cdc described the cases and requested that state public health laboratories send to cdc all influenza a specimens that could not be subtyped. That same day cdc responded to media inquiries related to the mmwr from medical reporters.
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Because of this, initial reports referred to the virus as a swine origin influenza virus. However, investigations of initial human cases did not identify exposures to pigs and quickly it became apparent that this new virus was circulating among humans and not among. Infection with this new influenza a virus (then referred to as swine origin influenza a virus) was first detected in a 10-year-old patient in California on April 15, 2009, who was tested for influenza as part of a clinical study. Laboratory testing at cdc confirmed that this virus was new to humans. Two list days later, cdc laboratory testing confirmed a second infection with this virus in another patient, an 8-year-old living in California about 130 miles away from the first patient who was tested as part of an influenza surveillance project. There was no known connection between the two patients. Laboratory analysis at cdc determined that the viruses presentation obtained from these two patients were very similar to each other, and different from any other influenza viruses previously seen either in humans or animals. Testing showed that these two viruses were resistant to the two antiviral drugs amantadine and rimantadine, but susceptible to the antiviral drugs oseltamivir and zanamivir.
virus. Despite differences in planning scenarios and the actual 2009 H1N1 pandemic, many of the systems established through pandemic planning were used and useful for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response. Cdcs response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response was complex, multi-faceted and long-term, lasting more than a year. This document seeks to document for the public the key events of the pandemic as they unfolded and cdcs response. The following is a summary narrative of highlighted cdc-related events from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. A virus Emerges 2009 H1N1 was first detected in the United States in April 2009. This virus was a unique combination of influenza virus genes never previously identified in either animals or people. The virus genes were a combination of genes most closely related to north American swine-lineage H1N1 and Eurasian lineage swine-origin H1N1 influenza viruses.
Another way to say that is that a scientific hypothesis is never completely final because the information underlying the hypothesis is always open to inspection, verification, and replication. If the underlying information (data) can not be verified or reproduced, the hypothesis is false. The usgs seems to be arguing that its science should not be subject to the foundational principles of science. Updated: June 16, 2010, this document summarizes key events of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and cdcs response activities best for historical purposes. This document is a summary; it is not a comprehensive account of all cdc actions and activities nor is it intended to represent response efforts by other agencies and partners. Pandemic Preparedness, background, the 2009 H1N1 influenza (flu) pandemic occurred against a backdrop of pandemic response planning at all levels of government including years of developing, refining and regularly exercising response plans at the international, federal, state, local, and community levels. At the time, experts believed that avian influenza a (H5N1) viruses posed the greatest pandemic threat.
This is a summary and response paper on the
In its, foia lawsuit against the usgs (Case. Dc 1:2014cv01200 pctc filed a response to the usgs. Motion for Summary judgment (mosj) and its own Cross mosj on may 16, 2016. The filing is available here. The filing included one subsidiary document, declaration of supermarket Anne lehuray, available here. It is highly ironic that the usgs an agency that describes itself as aspiring to scientific excellence argues that the reason for withholding data is fear of criticism. Yet the very definition of what makes a statement a scientific hypothesis is that it can be subjected to falsification.